Related papers: Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games

This paper considers no-regret learning for repeated continuous-kernel games with lossy bandit feedback. Since it is difficult to give the explicit model of the utility functions in dynamic environments, the players' action can only be…

The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…

A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, {\em at a minimum}, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The algorithm that has come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been proven to…

The AlphaZero algorithm for the learning of strategy games via self-play, which has produced superhuman ability in the games of Go, chess, and shogi, uses a quantitative reward function for game outcomes, requiring the users of the…

This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…

Consider a scenario where a player chooses an action in each round $t$ out of $T$ rounds and observes the incurred cost after a delay of $d_{t}$ rounds. The cost functions and the delay sequence are chosen by an adversary. We show that in a…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

We introduce the "inverse bandit" problem of estimating the rewards of a multi-armed bandit instance from observing the learning process of a low-regret demonstrator. Existing approaches to the related problem of inverse reinforcement…

The behavior of no-regret learning algorithms is well understood in two-player min-max (i.e, zero-sum) games. In this paper, we investigate the behavior of no-regret learning in min-max games with dependent strategy sets, where the strategy…

We consider the problem of stochastic $K$-armed dueling bandit in the contextual setting, where at each round the learner is presented with a context set of $K$ items, each represented by a $d$-dimensional feature vector, and the goal of…

We study the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem with composite and anonymous feedback. In this model, the reward of pulling an arm spreads over a period of time (we call this period as reward interval) and the player receives partial rewards…

We study the extent to which standard machine learning algorithms rely on exchangeability and independence of data by introducing a monotone adversarial corruption model. In this model, an adversary, upon looking at a "clean" i.i.d.…

This work studies the problem of learning episodic Markov Decision Processes with known transition and bandit feedback. We develop the first algorithm with a ``best-of-both-worlds'' guarantee: it achieves $\mathcal{O}(log T)$ regret when…

We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting. We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily strictly monotone. This relaxation of strict monotonicity…

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…

In two-player zero-sum games, the learning dynamic based on optimistic Hedge achieves one of the best-known regret upper bounds among strongly-uncoupled learning dynamics. With an appropriately chosen learning rate, the social and…

We study the problem of online learning in two-sided non-stationary matching markets, where the objective is to converge to a stable match. In particular, we consider the setting where one side of the market, the arms, has fixed known set…

Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…

Online learning algorithms often face a fundamental trilemma: balancing regret guarantees between adversarial and stochastic settings and providing baseline safety against a fixed comparator. While existing methods excel in one or two of…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…