Related papers: Synchronization Games
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which several interacting populations evolving in $\mathbb R^d$ aim at reaching given target sets in minimal time. The movement of each agent is described by a…
Building on the line of work [DIRT15a], [DIRT15b], [NS17a], [DT17], [HLS18], [HS18] we continue the study of particle systems with singular interaction through hitting times. In contrast to the previous research, we (i) consider very…
The non-equilibrium steady states emerging from stochastic resetting to a distribution is studied. We show that for a range of processes, the steady-state moments can be expressed as a linear combination of the moments of the distribution…
This paper establishes the existence of equilibria result of a class of mean field games with singular controls. The interaction takes place through both states and controls. A relaxed solution approach is used. To circumvent the tightness…
We propose a thermodynamically consistent minimal model to study synchronization which is made of driven and interacting three-state units. This system exhibits at the mean-field level two bifurcations separating three dynamical phases: a…
We study asynchronous dynamics in a network of interacting agents updating their binary states according to a time-varying threshold rule. Specifically, agents revise their state asynchronously by comparing the weighted average of the…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is…
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…
The Minority Game framework was recently generalized to account for the possibility that agents adapt not only through strategy selection but also by diversifying their response according to the kind of dynamical regime, or the risk, they…
In a probabilistic mean-field game driven by a linear diffusion an individual player aims to minimize an ergodic long-run cost by controlling the diffusion through a pair of -- increasing and decreasing -- c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…
We study the dynamics of phase synchronization in growing populations of discrete phase oscillatory systems when the division process is coupled to the distribution of oscillator phases. Using mean field theory, linear stability analysis,…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff,…
We consider stochastic mean field games for which the state space is a network. In the ergodic case, they are described by a system coupling a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a Fokker-Planck equation, whose unknowns are the invariant…
We study systems of identical coupled oscillators introducing a distribution of delay times in the coupling. For arbitrary network topologies, we show that the frequency and stability of the fully synchronized states depend only on the mean…
Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…