Related papers: Synchronization Games
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
We introduce and study a nonlinear discrete dynamical system describing the evolution of a resource distribution among interacting agents. The model generalizes several classical mean-field and opinion-dynamics frameworks and is defined on…
We study a mean field game in continuous time over a finite horizon, T, where the state of each agent is binary and where players base their strategic decisions on two, possibly competing, factors: the willingness to align with the majority…
Recently, R. Carmona, Q. Cormier, and M. Soner proposed a Mean Field Game (MFG) version of the classical Kuramoto model, which describes synchronization phenomena in a large population of rational interacting oscillators. The MFG model…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time horizons, and the mean-field interaction of the representative company…
In this paper we consider symmetric games where a large number of players can be in any one of d states. We derive a limiting mean field model and characterize its main properties. This mean field limit is a system of coupled ordinary…
This paper investigates the exponential stability of abstract mean field systems in their synchronized state. We analyze stability by studying the linearized system and demonstrate the existence of an exponentially stable invariant…
We study the dynamics of a spin-flip model with a mean field interaction. The system is non reversible, spacially inhomogeneous, and it is designed to model social interactions. We obtain the limiting behavior of the empirical averages in…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…
Dynamics in a distributed system are self-stabilizing if they are guaranteed to reach a stable state regardless of how the system is initialized. Game dynamics are uncoupled if each player's behavior is independent of the other players'…
We consider stationary viscous Mean-Field Games systems in the case of local, decreasing and unbounded coupling. These systems arise in ergodic mean-field game theory, and describe Nash equilibria of games with a large number of agents…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…