Related papers: The Limits of Price Discrimination Under Privacy C…
Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's…
We study how privacy technologies affect user and advertiser behavior in a simple economic model of targeted advertising. In our model, a consumer first decides whether or not to buy a good, and then an advertiser chooses an advertisement…
We study privacy-utility trade-offs where users share privacy-correlated useful information with a service provider to obtain some utility. The service provider is adversarial in the sense that it can infer the users' private information…
An information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios is studied where the private data is either hidden or observable. In each scenario, privacy leakage constraints are considered using two different measures. In…
We study how market segmentation affects consumers when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously. We characterize the…
Convex programming with linear constraints plays an important role in the operation of a number of everyday systems. However, absent any additional protections, revealing or acting on the solutions to such problems may reveal information…
A privacy mechanism design problem is studied through the lens of information theory. In this work, an agent observes useful data $Y=(Y_1,...,Y_N)$ that is correlated with private data $X=(X_1,...,X_N)$ which is assumed to be also…
Consider a data publishing setting for a data set with public and private features. The objective of the publisher is to maximize the amount of information about the public features in a revealed data set, while keeping the information…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
We study a problem of privacy-preserving mechanism design. A data collector wants to obtain data from individuals to perform some computations. To relieve the privacy threat to the contributors, the data collector adopts a…
The design of a statistical signal processing privacy problem is studied where the private data is assumed to be observable. In this work, an agent observes useful data $Y$, which is correlated with private data $X$, and wants to disclose…
An information-theoretic privacy mechanism design is studied, where an agent observes useful data $Y$ which is correlated with the private data $X$. The agent wants to reveal the information to a user, hence, the agent utilizes a privacy…
As smart meters continue to be deployed around the world collecting unprecedented levels of fine-grained data about consumers, we need to find mechanisms that are fair to both, (1) the electric utility who needs the data to improve their…
We study price-discrimination games between buyers and a seller where privacy arises endogenously--that is, utility maximization yields equilibrium strategies where privacy occurs naturally. In this game, buyers with a high valuation for a…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…
We study the value of data privacy in a game-theoretic model of trading private data, where a data collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals) through an incentive mechanism. The private data of each…
This paper investigates third-degree price discrimination under endogenous market segmentation. Segmenting a market requires access to information about consumers, and this information comes with a cost. I explore the trade-offs between the…
As the frontier of machine learning applications moves further into human interaction, multiple concerns arise regarding automated decision-making. Two of the most critical issues are fairness and data privacy. On the one hand, one must…
We consider a scenario where a retailer can set different prices for different consumers in a smart grid. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the consumer's welfare. The retailer…