Related papers: Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Dynamic mechanism design studies how mechanism designers should allocate resources among agents in a time-varying environment. We consider the problem where the agents interact with the mechanism designer according to an unknown Markov…
Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents' reward functions may change with…
The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
Autonomous agents optimize the reward function we give them. What they don't know is how hard it is for us to design a reward function that actually captures what we want. When designing the reward, we might think of some specific training…
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of…
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a…
Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control…
Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…
Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously and collision-free through a shared area toward given goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…