Related papers: Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is centered around the state, controlling the signal's precision at…
The problem of sequential probability forecasting is considered in the most general setting: a model set C is given, and it is required to predict as well as possible if any of the measures (environments) in C is chosen to generate the…
Bayesian inference has theoretical attractions as a principled framework for reasoning about beliefs. However, the motivations of Bayesian inference which claim it to be the only 'rational' kind of reasoning do not apply in practice. They…
In Bayesian networks, exact belief propagation is achieved through message passing algorithms. These algorithms (ex: inward and outward) provide only a recursive definition of the corresponding messages. In contrast, when working on hidden…
We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…
Transductive conformal prediction addresses the simultaneous prediction for multiple data points. Given a desired confidence level, the objective is to construct a prediction set that includes the true outcomes with the prescribed…
Dependence on the parameter is continuous when perturbations of the parameter preserves strict preference for one alternative over another. We characterise this property via a utility function over alternatives that depends continuously on…
We characterize the properties of convexity, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity for conditional expectations of correspondences. These results are then applied to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the…
This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…
We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical…
Bayesian regression games are a special class of two-player general-sum Bayesian games in which the learner is partially informed about the adversary's objective through a Bayesian prior. This formulation captures the uncertainty in regard…
We present an efficient reduction that converts any machine learning algorithm into an interactive protocol, enabling collaboration with another party (e.g., a human) to achieve consensus on predictions and improve accuracy. This approach…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
Algorithms for computing equilibria, optima, and fixed points in nonconvex problems often depend sensitively on practitioner-chosen initial conditions. When uniqueness of a solution is of interest, a common heuristic is to run such…
A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to execute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in network architectures that is driven by the sharing of…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…