Related papers: Formal Verification of the Sumcheck Protocol
This paper presents IsaBIL, a binary analysis framework in Isabelle/HOL that is based on the widely used Binary Analysis Platform (BAP). Specifically, in IsaBIL, we formalise BAP's intermediate language, called BIL and integrate it with…
Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptosystems. Masking is a widely used countermeasure against such attacks, but proving the security of masked algorithms is error-prone without formal verification. In this work,…
Statistical Model Checking (SMC) is a trade-off between testing and formal verification. The core idea of the approach is to conduct some simulations of the system and verify if they satisfy some given property. In this paper we show that…
We construct a classically verifiable succinct interactive argument for quantum computation (BQP) with communication complexity and verifier runtime that are poly-logarithmic in the runtime of the BQP computation (and polynomial in the…
Modern blockchains increasingly consist of multiple clients that implement a single blockchain protocol. If there is a semantic mismatch between the protocol implementations, the blockchain can permanently split and introduce new attack…
According to actual needs, generalized signcryption scheme can flexibly work as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme. In this paper, firstly, we give a security model for identity based generalized signcryption…
Many real-world applications are increasingly incorporating automated decision-making, driven by the widespread adoption of ML/AI inference for planning and guidance. This study examines the growing need for verifiable computing in…
We describe our ongoing project of formalization of algebraic methods for geometry theorem proving (Wu's method and the Groebner bases method), their implementation and integration in educational tools. The project includes formal…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
We present a trustworthy connection between the Leon verification system and the Isabelle proof assistant. Leon is a system for verifying functional Scala programs. It uses a variety of automated theorem provers (ATPs) to check verification…
Although good encryption functions are probabilistic, most symbolic models do not capture this aspect explicitly. A typical solution, recently used to prove the soundness of such models with respect to computational ones, is to explicitly…
Hybrid systems with both discrete and continuous dynamics are an important model for real-world cyber-physical systems. The key challenge is to ensure their correct functioning w.r.t. safety requirements. Promising techniques to ensure…
With recent progress on experimental quantum information processing, an important question has arisen as to whether it is possible to verify arbitrary computation performed on a quantum processor. A number of protocols have been proposed to…
With the increasing adoption of decentralized information systems based on a variety of permissionless blockchain networks, the choice of consensus mechanism is at the core of many controversial discussions. Ethereum's recent transition…
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during…
The study of interactive proofs in the context of distributed network computing is a novel topic, recently introduced by Kol, Oshman, and Saxena [PODC 2018]. In the spirit of sequential interactive proofs theory, we study the power of…
We describe SeCaV, a sequent calculus verifier for first-order logic in Isabelle/HOL, and the SeCaV Unshortener, an online tool that expands succinct derivations into the full SeCaV syntax. We leverage the power of Isabelle/HOL as a proof…
We introduce a technology to formally verify that a software system satisfies a temporal specification of functional correctness, without revealing the system itself. Our method combines a deductive approach to model checking to obtain a…
This set of theories presents a formalisation in Isabelle/HOL+Isar of data dependencies between components. The approach allows to analyse system structure oriented towards efficient checking of system: it aims at elaborating for a concrete…
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical…