Related papers: Capacity Modification in the Stable Matching Probl…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
In computing, as in many aspects of life, changes incur cost. Many optimization problems are formulated as a one-time instance starting from scratch. However, a common case that arises is when we already have a set of prior assignments, and…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental and ubiquitous managerial function, typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
Due to the increasing nature of flexible work and the recent requirements from COVID-19 restrictions, workplaces are becoming more hybrid (i.e. allowing workers to work between traditional office spaces and elsewhere including from home).…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side corresponds to applicants who have preferences and the other side to houses who do not have preferences. We consider two different types of this market: one, where the applicants…