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In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM),…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-11-07 Hao Chung , Elaine Shi

Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-02-15 Michael Tang , Alex Zhang

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-04-23 Ke Wu , Elaine Shi , Hao Chung

Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-01-25 Sankarshan Damle , Manisha Padala , Sujit Gujar

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-10-25 Aadityan Ganesh , Clayton Thomas , S. Matthew Weinberg

In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-12-25 Xi Chen , David Simchi-Levi , Zishuo Zhao , Yuan Zhou

With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2024-06-28 Kun Li , Guangpeng Qi , Guangyong Shang , Wanli Deng , Minghui Xu , Xiuzhen Cheng

Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-05-24 Yotam Gafni , Aviv Yaish

Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-02-21 Elaine Shi , Hao Chung , Ke Wu

Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-12-27 Tim Roughgarden

Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party. The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well-designed Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate limited…

General Economics · Economics 2023-05-05 Luyao Zhang , Fan Zhang

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-04 Maryam Bahrani , Pranav Garimidi , Tim Roughgarden

A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-03-03 Shoeb Siddiqui , Ganesh Vanahalli , Sujit Gujar

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

ZK-Rollups have emerged as a leading solution for blockchain scalability, leveraging succinct proofs primarily based on ZKP protocols. This paper explores the design of transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) for ZK-Rollups, focusing on how key…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-10-18 Stefanos Chaliasos , Nicolas Mohnblatt , Assimakis Kattis , Benjamin Livshits

A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and…

General Economics · Economics 2025-08-11 Yulin Liu , Yuxuan Lu , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang , Luyao Zhang , Yinhong Zhao

Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-08-11 Bahar Acilan , Andrei Constantinescu , Lioba Heimbach , Roger Wattenhofer

In the Bitcoin system, transaction fees serve as an incentive for blockchain confirmations. In general, a transaction with a higher fee is likely to be included in the next block mined, whereas a transaction with a smaller fee or no fee may…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-27 Limeng Zhang , Rui Zhou , Qing Liu , Chengfei Liu , M. Ali Babar

Modern blockchains increasingly rely on parallel execution to improve throughput. We show several industry and academic transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) struggle to simultaneously account for execution parallelism while remaining…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-07 Sarisht Wadhwa , Aviv Yaish , Fan Zhang , Kartik Nayak
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