Related papers: Concurrent Strategies on Games with Algebras
Behavioural equivalences can be characterized via bisimulation, modal logics, and spoiler-duplicator games. In this paper we work in the general setting of coalgebra and focus on generic algorithms for computing the winning strategies of…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…
Often, a given selection game studied in the literature has a known dual game. In dual games, a winning strategy for a player in either game may be used to create a winning strategy for the opponent in the dual. For example, the Rothberger…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
We study the game of go from a complex network perspective. We construct a directed network using a suitable definition of tactical moves including local patterns, and study this network for different datasets of professional tournaments…
A quantitative model of concurrent interaction is introduced. The basic objects are linear combinations of partial order relations, acted upon by a group of permutations that represents potential non-determinism in synchronisation. This…
This paper focuses on "tracing player knowledge" in educational games. Specifically, given a set of concepts or skills required to master a game, the goal is to estimate the likelihood with which the current player has mastery of each of…
Geuvers and Jacobs (LMCS 2021) formulated the notion of apartness relation on state-based systems modelled as coalgebras. In this context apartness is formally dual to bisimilarity, and gives an explicit proof system for showing that…
We argue for the use of active learning methods for player modelling. In active learning, the learning algorithm chooses where to sample the search space so as to optimise learning progress. We hypothesise that player modelling based on…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite "play", which determines the winner or payoff of the game.…
When a game involves many agents or when communication between agents is not possible, it is useful to resort to distributed learning where each agent acts in complete autonomy without any information on the other agents' situations.…
In an all-pay auction, only one bidder wins but all bidders must pay the auctioneer. All-pay bidding games arise from attaching a similar bidding structure to traditional combinatorial games to determine which player moves next. In contrast…