Related papers: Cooperation and profit allocation in distribution …
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…
Cooperative driving at isolated intersections attracted great interest and had been well discussed in recent years. However, cooperative driving in multi-intersection road networks remains to be further investigated, because many algorithms…
What is the performance cost of using simple, decoupled control policies in inherently coupled systems? Motivated by industrial refrigeration systems, where centralized compressors exhibit economies of scale yet traditional control employs…
In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit…
Our research is concerned with studying behavioural changes within a dynamic system, i.e. health care, and their effects on the decision-making process. Evolutionary Game theory is applied to investigate the most probable strategy(ies)…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
While consolidation strategies form the backbone of many supply chain optimisation problems, exploitation of multi-tier material relationships through consolidation remains an understudied area, despite being a prominent feature of…
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
Supply networks require collaboration in a competitive environment. To achieve this, nodes in the network often form symbiotic relationships as they can be adversely effected by the closure of companies in the network, especially where…
A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…