Related papers: Lightweight Countermeasures Against Static Power S…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…

Active distribution networks facilitating bidirectional power exchange with renewable energy resources are susceptible to cyberattacks due to integration of a diverse array of cyber components. This study introduces a grid-level defense…

Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on…

The integration of synchronous generators and energy storage systems operated through communication networks introduces new challenges and vulnerabilities to the electric grid, where cyber attacks can corrupt sensor measurements or control…

Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of…

We note that constituent fields (notably the fraction-of-seconds timestamp field) in the data payload structure of the synchrophasor communication protocol (IEEE C37.118 standard) are overprovisioned relative to real-world usage and needs,…

CPU caches introduce variations into the execution time of programs that can be exploited by adversaries to recover private information about users or cryptographic keys. Establishing the security of countermeasures against this threat…

With the exponential rise in the use of cloud services, smart devices, and IoT devices, advanced cyber attacks have become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous. Furthermore, the rapid evolution of computing architectures and memory…

We develop investment approaches to secure electric power systems against load attacks where a malicious intruder (the attacker) covertly changes reactive power setpoints of loads to push the grid towards voltage instability while the…

Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire…

Ensuring reliable operation of large power systems subjected to multiple outages is a challenging task because of the combinatorial nature of the problem. Traditional approaches for security assessment are often limited by their scope…

Physical side-channel attacks represent a great challenge for today's chip design. Although attacks on CMOS dynamic power represent a class of state-of-the-art attacks, many other effects potentially affect the security of CMOS chips…

This paper uses network packet capture data to demonstrate how Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA) can be used in a new way to detect anomalies which serve as cyber-network attack indicators. The approach requires only a few…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

The vulnerability of machine learning systems to adversarial attacks questions their usage in many applications. In this paper, we propose a randomized diversification as a defense strategy. We introduce a multi-channel architecture in a…

Modern power networks face increasing vulnerability to cascading failures due to high complexity and the growing penetration of intermittent resources, necessitating rigorous security assessment beyond the conventional $N-1$ criterion.…

Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide…

Efficient and effective attacks are crucial for reliable evaluation of defenses, and also for developing robust models. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack has been demonstrated to be one of the most successful adversarial attacks.…

The IP-stride prefetcher has recently been exploited to leak secrets through side-channel attacks. It, however, cannot be simply disabled for security with prefetching speedup as a sacrifice. The state-of-the-art defense tries to retain the…

Existing power analysis techniques rely on strong adversary models with prior knowledge of the leakage or training data. We introduce side-channel analysis with unsupervised learning (SCAUL) that can recover the secret key without requiring…