Related papers: Competitive Equilibrium in Microgrids With Dynamic…

This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where energy tariffs…

Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near future.…

We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…

The current massive installation of distributed resources in electricity distribution systems is transforming these systems into active dispatching subjects. At the same time, the need to compensate for the intermittent generation of an…

Generative model ecosystems increasingly operate as competitive multi-platform markets, where platforms strategically select models from a shared pool and users with heterogeneous preferences choose among them. Understanding how platforms…

Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…

We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and…

We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to…

This paper develops a strategic model of trade between two regions in which, depending on the relation among output, financial resources and transportation costs, the adjustment of prices towards an equilibrium is studied. We derive…

We analyze competition on nonlinear prices in homogeneous goods markets with consumer search. In equilibrium firms offer two-part tariffs consisting of a linear price and lump-sum fee. The equilibrium production is socially efficient as the…

We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost…

According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…

We show that, with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents' substitution effects, not their income effects. Our Equilibrium Existence Duality allows us to transport results on the…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…

Uncertainty in the output power of large-scale wind power plants (WPPs) can face the electricity market players with undesirable profit variations. Market players can hedge themselves against these risks by participating in forward…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We consider a scenario where a retailer can set different prices for different consumers in a smart grid. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the consumer's welfare. The retailer…

This paper addresses the problem of energy sharing between a population of price-taking agents who adopt decentralized primal-dual gradient dynamics to find the Competitive Equilibrium (CE). Although the CE is efficient, it does not ensure…

We study a new kind of non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a…