Related papers: Conditional cooperation with longer memory
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to this literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters…
The theory of direct reciprocity explores how individuals cooperate when they interact repeatedly. In repeated interactions, individuals can condition their behaviour on what happened earlier. One prominent example of a conditional strategy…
Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…
Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the…
Using past behaviors to guide future actions is essential for fostering cooperation in repeated social dilemmas. Traditional memory-based strategies that focus on recent interactions have yielded valuable insights into the evolution of…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…
Biological and social scientists have long been interested in understanding how to reconcile individual and collective interests in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Many effective strategies have been proposed, and they are often categorized…
Direct reciprocity based on the repeated prisoner's dilemma has been intensively studied. Most theoretical investigations have concentrated on memory-$1$ strategies, a class of elementary strategies just reacting to the previous-round…
In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other player is free to switch. Such characterizations have led to…
Direct reciprocity is one of the key mechanisms accounting for cooperation in our social life. According to recent understanding, most of classical strategies for direct reciprocity fall into one of two classes, `partners' or `rivals'. A…
Direct reciprocity is a well-known mechanism that could explain how cooperation emerges and prevails in an evolving population. Numerous prior researches have studied the emergence of cooperation in multiplayer games. However, most of them…
Since the introduction of zero-determinant strategies, extortionate strategies have received considerable interest. While an interesting class of strategies, the definitions of extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid, apply only to…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
Exploration of mechanisms underlying the emergence of collective cooperation remains a focal point in field of evolution of cooperation. Prevailing studies often neglect historical information, relying on the latest rewards as the primary…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…