Related papers: Measuring productivity in networks: A game-theoret…
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…
This paper proposes a coalitional game theory-based approach for reserve optimization to enable DERs participate in tertiary frequency regulation. A two-stage approach is proposed to effectively and precisely allocate spinning reserve…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
High fidelity simulation of large-sized complex networks can be realized on a distributed computing platform that leverages the combined resources of multiple processors or machines. In a discrete event driven simulation, the assignment of…
We consider the problem of collaborative inference in a sensor network with heterogeneous and statistically dependent sensor observations. Each sensor aims to maximize its inference performance by forming a coalition with other sensors and…
Agricultural industries face increasing pressure to optimize efficiency and reduce costs in a competitive and resource-constrained global market. As firms seek innovative ways to enhance productivity, cooperative strategies have emerged as…
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare…
Research on peer effects in sociology has been focused for long on social influence power to investigate the social foundations for social interactions. This paper extends Xu(2011)'s large--network--based game model by allowing for…
In this paper, we introduce past-aware game-theoretic centrality, a class of centrality measures that captures the collaborative contribution of nodes in a network, accounting for both uncertain and certain collaborators. A general…
Given a social network of users with selection cost, the \textsc{Budgeted Influence Maximization Problem} (\emph{BIM Problem} in short) asks for selecting a subset of the nodes (known as \emph{seed nodes}) within an allocated budget for…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
Tackling complex team problems requires understanding each team member's skills in order to devise a task assignment maximizing the team performance. This paper proposes a novel quantitative model describing the decentralized process by…
Attribution scores can be applied in data management to quantify the contribution of individual items to conclusions from the data, as part of the explanation of what led to these conclusions. In Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,…
"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining…
In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit…
In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al.…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…