Related papers: When and Where To Submit A Paper
We study the secretary problem in which rank-ordered lists are generated by the Mallows model and the goal is to identify the highest-ranked candidate through a sequential interview process which does not allow rejected candidates to be…
We study a sequential resource allocation problem involving a fixed number of recurring jobs. At each time-step the manager should distribute available resources among the jobs in order to maximise the expected number of completed jobs.…
The conference peer review process involves three constituencies with different objectives: authors want their papers accepted at prestigious venues (and quickly), conferences want to present a program with many high-quality and few…
For many years, achievements and discoveries made by scientists are made aware through research papers published in appropriate journals or conferences. Often, established scientists and especially newbies are caught up in the dilemma of…
The well-known secretary problem in sequential analysis and optimal stopping theory asks one to maximize the probability of finding the optimal candidate in a sequentially examined list under the constraint that accept/reject decisions are…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
Everyday, a vast stream of research documents is submitted to conferences, anthologies, journals, newsletters, annual reports, daily papers, and various periodicals. Many such publications use independent external specialists to review…
Peer review (e.g., grading assignments in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), academic paper review) is an effective and scalable method to evaluate the products (e.g., assignments, papers) of a large number of agents when the number of…
Machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) conferences including NeurIPS and ICML have experienced a significant decline in peer review quality in recent years. To address this growing challenge, we introduce the Isotonic…
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision…
A number of applications involve sequential arrival of users, and require showing each user an ordering of items. A prime example (which forms the focus of this paper) is the bidding process in conference peer review where reviewers enter…
Paper journals use a small number of trusted academics to select information on behalf of all their readers. This inflexibility in the selection was justified due to the expense of publishing. The advent of cheap distribution via the…
We consider a variant of the classical Secretary Problem. In this setting, the candidates are ranked according to some exchangeable random variable and the quest is to maximize the expected quality of the chosen aspirant. We find an upper…
We investigate the design of mechanisms to incentivize high quality in crowdsourcing environments with strategic agents, when entry is an endogenous, strategic choice. Modeling endogenous entry in crowdsourcing is important because there is…
Recommender systems rely heavily on the predictive accuracy of the learning algorithm. Most work on improving accuracy has focused on the learning algorithm itself. We argue that this algorithmic focus is myopic. In particular, since…
Conference paper assignment, i.e., the task of assigning paper submissions to reviewers, presents multi-faceted issues for recommender systems research. Besides the traditional goal of predicting `who likes what?', a conference management…
Consider a population of agents who repeatedly compete for awards, as in the case of researchers annually applying for grants. Noise in the selection process may encourage entry of low quality proposals, forcing the principal to commit…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification. The framework captures various contexts such as school…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…