Related papers: Necessary players and values
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
B\'eal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist…
The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor…
Interpretability has arisen as a key desideratum of machine learning models alongside performance. Approaches so far have been primarily concerned with fixed dimensional inputs emphasizing feature relevance or selection. In contrast, we…
In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
The desirable gambles framework provides a foundational approach to imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility assumptions. This paper introduces function-coherent gambles, a generalization that accommodates…
"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining…
In this paper, a novel quantization scheme for cooperative games is proposed. The considered circuit is inspired by the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein protocol modified to represent cooperation between players and extended to $3$-qubit states.…
We study a class of nonzero-sum stochastic differential games between two teams with agents in each team interacting through graphon aggregates. On the one hand, in each large population group, agents act together to optimize a common…
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only…
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some…
Transactions are an important aspect of human social life, and represent dynamic flow of information, intangible values, such as trust, as well as monetary and social capital. Although much research has been conducted on the nature of…
We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…
Zero-sum stochastic games provide a rich model for competitive decision making. However, under general forms of state uncertainty as considered in the Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG), such decision making problems are still not…
We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…