Related papers: BAR Nash Equilibrium and Application to Blockchain…
We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The…
We present SmartShards: a new sharding algorithm for improving Byzantine tolerance and churn resistance in blockchains. Our algorithm places a peer in multiple shards to create an overlap. This simplifies cross-shard communication and shard…
Sharding scales throughput by splitting blockchain nodes into parallel groups. However, different shards' independent and random scheduling for cross-shard transactions results in numerous conflicts and aborts, since cross-shard…
Blockchain-based smart contracts offer a new take on credible commitment, where players can commit to actions in reaction to actions of others. Such reaction-function games extend on strategic games with players choosing reaction functions…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
We consider shared workspace scenarios with humans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept to…
Nash equilibrium} (NE) can be stated as a formal theorem on a multilinear form, free of game theory terminology. On the other hand, inspired by this formalism, we state and prove a {\it multilinear minimax theorem}, a generalization of von…
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for the mechanisms used in Internet services (e.g., online reviews and question-answer websites) to incentivize users to generate high-quality content. Most existing work assumes that…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
The problem of reliably transferring data from a set of $N_P$ producers to a set of $N_C$ consumers in the BAR model, named N-party BAR Transfer (NBART), is an important building block for volunteer computing systems. An algorithm to solve…
Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks.…
In 2015, Eyal proposed the first game-theoretical model for analyzing the equilibrium of blockchain pooling: when the blockchain pools are abstracted as a non-cooperative game, two pools can reach a Nash equilibrium with a closed-form…
We present a general consensus framework that allows to easily introduce a customizable Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm to an existing (Delegated) Proof-of-Stake blockchain. We prove the safety of the protocol under the…
Blockchains add transactions to a distributed shared ledger by arriving at consensus on sets of transactions contained in blocks. This provides a total ordering on a set of global transactions. However, total ordering is not enough to…
The ability to perform repeated Byzantine agreement lies at the heart of important applications such as blockchain price oracles or replicated state machines. Any such protocol requires the following properties: (1) \textit{Byzantine…
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Blockchains use peer-to-peer networks for disseminating information among peers, but these networks currently do not have any provable guarantees for desirable properties such as Byzantine fault tolerance, good connectivity and small…
We present an analysis of the Proof-of-Work consensus algorithm, used on the Bitcoin blockchain, using a Mean Field Game framework. Using a master equation, we provide an equilibrium characterization of the total computational power devoted…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…