Related papers: Epidemic Population Games And Perturbed Best Respo…
This paper proposes a potential game theoretic approach to address event-triggered distributed resource allocation in multi-agent systems. The fitness dynamic of the population is proposed and exploited as a linear parametervarying dynamic…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…
In this paper, we study the dynamics of epidemic processes taking place in temporal and adaptive networks. Building on the activity-driven network model, we propose an adaptive model of epidemic processes, where the network topology…
The recent COVID-19 pandemic has led to an increasing interest in the modeling and analysis of infectious diseases. The pandemic has made a significant impact on the way we behave and interact in our daily life. The past year has witnessed…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
The contact structure of the population shapes the progression of epidemics. Nonetheless, the joint evolution of individual behavioral adaptations and disease dynamics on networks remains poorly understood. We use a…
In this article, we have proposed an epidemic model by using probability cellular automata theory. The essential mathematical features are analyzed with the help of stability theory. We have given an alternative modelling approach for the…
In this paper, we present a Distributionally Robust Markov Decision Process (DRMDP) approach for addressing the dynamic epidemic control problem. The Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) model is widely used to represent the…
In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…
In this paper we consider a stochastic SEIQR (susceptible-exposed-infected-quarantined-recovered) epidemic model with a generalized incidence function. Using the Lyapunov method, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a global…
We study the problem of a policymaker who aims at taming the spread of an epidemic while minimizing its associated social costs. The main feature of our model lies in the fact that the disease's transmission rate is a diffusive stochastic…
This paper proposes a feedback design that effectively copes with uncertainties for reliable epidemic monitoring and control. There are several optimization-based methods to estimate the parameters of an epidemic model by utilizing past…
Combating an epidemic entails finding a plan that describes when and how to apply different interventions, such as mask-wearing mandates, vaccinations, school or workplace closures. An optimal plan will curb an epidemic with minimal loss of…
Incorporating decision-making dynamics during an outbreak poses a challenge for epidemiology, faced by several modeling approaches siloed by different disciplines. We propose an epi-economic model where high-frequency choices of individuals…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
We study the interplay between epidemic dynamics and human decision making for epidemics that involve reinfection risk; in particular, the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) and the susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI)…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…
We propose a dynamical model for describing the spread of epidemics. This model is an extension of the SIQR (susceptible-infected-quarantined-recovered) and SIRP (susceptible-infected-recovered-pathogen) models used earlier to describe…
A probabilistic approach to the epidemic evolution on realistic social-contact networks allows for characteristic differences among subjects, including the individual number and structure of social contacts, and the heterogeneity of the…