Related papers: Multiplayer General Lotto game

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents' preferences. Taking a game-theoretic perspective, we study budget-aggregation games where each…

In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…

We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…

This paper introduces a consensus-based generalized multi-population aggregative game coordination approach with application to electric vehicles charging under transmission line constraints. The algorithm enables agents to seek an…

In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure…

This paper examines two different variants of the Ludo game, involving multiple dice and a fixed number of total turns. Within each variant, multiple game lengths (total no. of turns) are considered. To compare the two variants, a set of…

We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…

We consider a system of single- or double integrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing a fully-distributed…

We present for every $n\ge4$ an $n$-player game in normal form with payoffs in $\{0,1,2\}$ that has a unique, fully mixed, Nash equilibrium in which all the probability weights are irradical (i.e., algebraic but not closed form expressible…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

We consider sequences of games $\mathcal{G}=\{G_1,G_2,\ldots\}$ where, for all $n$, $G_n$ has the same set of players. Such sequences arise in the analysis of running time of players in games, in electronic money systems such as Bitcoin and…