Related papers: The Distortion of Threshold Approval Matching
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
Individuals often navigate several options with incomplete knowledge of their own preferences. Information provisioning tools such as public rankings and personalized recommendations have become central to helping individuals make choices,…
We consider a one-sided matching problem where agents who are partitioned into disjoint classes and each class must receive fair treatment in a desired matching. This model, proposed by Benabbou et al. [2019], aims to address various…
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the…
This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…
Consider a set of items and a set of $m$ colors, where each item is associated to one color. Consider also $n$ computational agents connected by a ring. Each agent holds a subset of the items and items of the same color can be held by…
We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
Machine learning algorithms play an important role in a variety of important decision-making processes, including targeted advertisement displays, home loan approvals, and criminal behavior predictions. Given the far-reaching impact of…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…
Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with…
Bipartite b-matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to one or more agents or items on the other, is a classical model that is used in myriad application areas such as healthcare, advertising, education, and general…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…