Related papers: Do backrun auctions protect traders?
This work's purpose is to understand the dynamics of limit order books in order-driven markets. We try to illustrate a dynamical trading mechanism attached to the microstructure of limit order markets. We capture the iterative nature of…
Cloud providers offer end-users various pricing schemes to allow them to tailor VMs to their needs, e.g., a pay-as-you-go billing scheme, called \textit{on-demand}, and a discounted contract scheme, called \textit{reserved instances}. This…
We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market.…
Prediction markets allow traders to bet on potential future outcomes. These markets exist for weather, political, sports, and economic forecasting. Within this work we consider a decentralized framework for prediction markets using…
This paper studies optimal market making for large-tick assets in the presence of latency. We consider a random walk model for the asset price, and formulate the market maker's optimization problem using Markov Decision Processes (MDP). We…
This paper presents a continuous-time model of intraday trading, pricing, and liquidity with dynamic TWAP and VWAP benchmarks. The model is solved in closed-form for the competitive equilibrium and also for non-price-taking equilibria. The…
This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…
Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency exchanges (shielded AMMs, batched swap auctions, sealed-bid order-flow auctions) alter what the pricing mechanism observes about order flow. We derive the unique linear Kyle equilibrium when a committed…
We show that filling an order with a large number of distinct counterparts incurs additional market impact, as opposed to filling the order with a small number of counterparts. For best execution, therefore, it may be beneficial to…
In this paper, we develop a more general framework of block-structured Markov processes in the queueing study of blockchain systems, which can provide analysis both for the stationary performance measures and for the sojourn times of any…
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…
Recently, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms on Ethereum are booming, and numerous traders are trying to capitalize on the opportunity for maximizing their benefits by launching front-running attacks and extracting Miner Extractable…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…
Two MEV builders now produce nearly 80\% of Ethereum blocks. Block builders have the ability to reorder transactions on the blockchain in a way that can be harmful to participants. We estimate they would pay in the aggregate nearly \$14…
The advent of decentralized trading markets introduces a number of new challenges for consensus protocols. In addition to the `usual' attacks -- a subset of the validators trying to prevent disagreement -- there is now the possibility of…
We consider the problem of optimal bidding for virtual trading in two-settlement electricity markets. A virtual trader aims to arbitrage on the differences between day-ahead and real-time market prices; both prices, however, are random and…
In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to…
Many blockchain platform are subject to maximal value extraction (MEV), and users on the platform are losing money while sending transactions because the transaction order can be manipulated to extract value from them. Consensus protocols…
We introduce and study a simple model of a limit order-driven market. Traders in this model can either trade at the market price or place a limit order, i.e. an instruction to buy (sell) a certain amount of the stock if its price falls…