Related papers: Playing the MEV Game on a First-Come-First-Served …
We propose a new, more potent attack on decentralized exchanges. This attack leverages absolute commitments, which are commitments that can condition on the strategies made by other agents. This attack allows an adversary to charge monopoly…
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from…
With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…
Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party. The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well-designed Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate limited…
Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in Constant Function Market Making is fairly well understood. Does having dynamic weights, as found in liquidity boostrap pools (LBPs), Temporal-function market makers (TFMMs), and Replicating market makers…
The convergence of mobile edge computing (MEC) and blockchain is transforming the current computing services in mobile networks, by offering task offloading solutions with security enhancement empowered by blockchain mining. Nevertheless,…
Decentralized Finance, mushrooming in permissionless blockchains, has attracted a recent surge in popularity. Due to the transparency of permissionless blockchains, opportunistic traders can compete to earn revenue by extracting Miner…
Blockchain has empowered computer systems to be more secure using a distributed network. However, the current blockchain design suffers from fairness issues in transaction ordering. Miners are able to reorder transactions to generate…
Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a promising technology that enhances the efficiency of mobile blockchain networks, by enabling miners, often acted by mobile users (MUs) with limited computing resources, to offload resource-intensive mining…
We study builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). BSC's Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) adopts a leaner design: only whitelisted builders can participate, blocks are produced at shorter intervals, and private order flow…
Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least…
Execution Tickets are currently discussed as a next evolutionary step in Ethereum's block space allocation mechanism, separating consensus rewards from execution rewards and selling execution rights through a dedicated market. We present a…
This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) provides a comprehensive historical analysis of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in blockchain systems, tracing its conceptual evolution through three distinct eras. We organize the fragmented…
This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a…
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at…
Current blockchain execution throughput is limited by data contention, reducing execution layer parallelism. Fast Ahead-of-Formation Optimization (FAFO) is the first blockchain transaction scheduler to address this problem by reordering…
We describe a plausible probabilistic model for a blockchain queueing environment in which rational, profit-maximising schedulers impose adversarial disciplines on incoming messages containing a payload that encodes a state transition in a…
We study a new "laminated" queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. The model aims to capture and generalise transaction queueing infrastructure that has arisen to organise MEV activity on public…
The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…