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We consider the market microstructure of automated market makers (AMMs) from the perspective of liquidity providers (LPs). Our central contribution is a ``Black-Scholes formula for AMMs''. We identify the main adverse selection cost…
We present V0LVER, an AMM protocol which solves an incentivization trilemma between users, passive liquidity providers, and block producers. V0LVER enables users and passive liquidity providers to interact without paying MEV or incurring…
Efficient risk transfer is an important condition for ensuring the sustainability of a market according to the established economics literature. In an inefficient market, significant financial imbalances may develop and potentially…
We assess the market risk of the DeFi lending protocols using a multi-asset agent-based model to simulate ensembles of users subject to price-driven liquidation risk. Our multi-asset methodology shows that the protocol's systemic risk is…
The entry of new technological infrastructures into the financial markets poses serious concerns about the misuse of the economic system for illicit purposes, such as money laundering and financing of terrorism. Although there are cases in…
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible…
Atomic swaps have been widely considered to be an ideal solution for cross-chain cryptocurrency transactions due to their trustless and decentralized nature. However, their adoption in practice has been strictly limited compared to…
This paper develops a robust mathematical framework for Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) by transitioning from traditional token reserve analyses to a coordinate system defined by price and intrinsic liquidity. We establish a…
We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader-follower…
This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among…
We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the \emph{partially active automated market maker} (PA-AMM). PA-AMM divides its reserves into two parts, the active and the passive parts, and uses only the active part for trading.…
Today, several solutions for cross-blockchain asset transfers exist. However, these solutions are either tailored to specific assets or neglect finality guarantees that prevent assets from getting lost in transit. In this paper, we present…
Triangle fees are a novel fee structure for AMMs, in which marginal fees are decreasing in a trade's size. That decline is proportional to the movement in the AMM's implied price, i.e. for every basis point the trade moves the ratio of…
This work focuses on the mathematical study of constant function market makers. We rigorously establish the conditions for optimal trading under the assumption of a quasilinear, but not necessarily convex (or concave), trade function. This…
This article explores the optimisation of trading strategies in Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) and centralised exchanges. We develop a model that accounts for the interaction between these two markets, estimating the conditional…
Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) have evolved dramatically since the introduction of Automated Market Makers (AMMs). In recent years, solver-based protocols have emerged as an alternative venue aiming to introduce competition for routing,…
The cryptocurrency market is volatile, non-stationary and non-continuous. Together with liquid derivatives markets, this poses a unique opportunity to study risk management, especially the hedging of options, in a turbulent market. We study…
Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update.…
We consider a prediction market in which all aspects are controlled by market forces, in particular the correct outcomes of events are decided by the market itself rather than by trusted arbiters. This kind of a decentralized prediction…
Designing automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial for decentralized token exchanges in cryptoeconomic systems. At the intersection of software engineering and economics, AMM design is complex and, if done incorrectly, can lead to…