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CPUs provide isolation mechanisms like virtualization and privilege levels to protect software. Yet these focus on architectural isolation while typically overlooking microarchitectural side channels, exemplified by Meltdown and Foreshadow.…
Closed-loop control systems employ continuous sensing and actuation to maintain controlled variables within preset bounds and achieve the desired system output. Intentional disturbances in the system, such as in the case of cyberattacks,…
Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous…
A major security threat to an integrated circuit (IC) design is the Hardware Trojan attack which is a malicious modification of the design. Previously several papers have investigated into side-channel analysis to detect the presence of…
Recently, code reuse attacks (CRAs), such as return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP), have emerged as a new class of ingenious security threatens. Attackers can utilize CRAs to hijack the control flow of…
This literature review discovers an implementation of formal logic systems in cyber security by enhancing access control models. We explore the characteristics of the existing access control theories, their limitations and how classical…
The advances of the Internet of Things (IoT) have had a fundamental impact and influence in sharping our rich living experiences. However, since IoT devices are usually resource-constrained, lightweight block ciphers have played a major…
Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…
To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often protected with techniques that require support modules to be linked into the application. It is well-known, however, that attackers can exploit…
The impeccable design of sensitive and cryptographic circuits (CC) against fault injection attacks is essential for modern data storage, communication, and computation systems that are susceptible to fault injection attacks. The robustness…
The oscillating performance of off-policy learning and persisting errors in the actor-critic (AC) setting call for algorithms that can conservatively learn to suit the stability-critical applications better. In this paper, we propose a…
We introduce the Lossy Implicit Network Activation Coding (LINAC) defence, an input transformation which successfully hinders several common adversarial attacks on CIFAR-$10$ classifiers for perturbations up to $\epsilon = 8/255$ in…
Code obfuscation is widely adopted in modern software development to protect intellectual property and hinder reverse engineering, but it also provides attackers with a powerful means to conceal malicious logic inside otherwise legitimate…
Building and maintaining a silicon foundry is a costly endeavor that requires substantial financial investment. From this scenario, the semiconductor business has largely shifted to a fabless model where the Integrated Circuit supply chain…
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are a core component of an Industrial Control System (ICS). However, if a PLC is compromised or the commands sent across a network from the PLCs are spoofed, consequences could be catastrophic. In this…
Integrated Circuits (ICs) are the target of diverse attacks during their lifetime. Fabrication-time attacks, such as the insertion of Hardware Trojans, can give an adversary access to privileged data and/or the means to corrupt the IC's…
Access control (AC) is the core of every architectural solution for information security. Indeed, no effective protection scheme can abstract from the careful design of access control policies, and infrastructures underlying modern…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
Manipulations of return addresses on the stack are the basis for a variety of attacks on programs written in memory unsafe languages. Dual stack schemes for protecting return addresses promise an efficient and effective defense against such…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit variations in program execution time to recover sensitive information. Cryptographic implementations are especially vulnerable to these attacks, since even small timing differences in operations such as…