Related papers: A Mean Field Game between Informed Traders and a B…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
This paper proposes a new mathematical paradigm to analyze discrete-time mean-field games. It is shown that finding Nash equilibrium solutions for a general class of discrete-time mean-field games is equivalent to solving an optimization…
We consider an $N$-player game where the states of the players evolve with time as Stochastic Differential Equations (SDEs) with interaction only in the drift terms. Each player controls the drift of the SDE satisfied by her state process,…
This paper develops a new methodology for studying continuous-time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically informed agents. This approach allows us to lift the restriction of risk neutrality imposed on market makers by…
We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…
We study discrete-time mean-field Markov games with infinite numbers of agents where each agent aims to minimize its ergodic cost. We consider the setting where the agents have identical linear state transitions and quadratic cost…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
We design a market-making model \`a la Avellaneda-Stoikov in which the market-takers act strategically, in the sense that they design their trading strategy based on an exogenous trading signal. The market-maker chooses her quotes based on…
Recent advances at the intersection of dense large graph limits and mean field games have begun to enable the scalable analysis of a broad class of dynamical sequential games with large numbers of agents. So far, results have been largely…
In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games of controls with common noises and their corresponding $N$-player games. The theory of mean field game of controls considers a class of mean field games where the…
Fictitious play is a popular learning algorithm in which players that utilize the history of actions played by the players and the knowledge of their own payoff matrix can converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the…
We study a toy model of linear-quadratic mean field game with delay. We "lift" the delayed dynamic into an infinite dimensional space, and recast the mean field game system which is made of a forward Kolmogorov equation and a backward…
In competitive games with private objectives, actions can reveal information about hidden parameters. Quantifying such information revelation, however, is substantially more challenging, since it depends not only on the opponent's hidden…
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…
This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an…
The rapid increase of photovoltaic cells, batteries, and Electric Vehicles (EVs) in electric grids can result in congested distribution networks. An alternative to enhancing network capacity is a redispatch market, allowing Distribution…
We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
This paper goes beyond the optimal trading Mean Field Game model introduced by Pierre Cardaliaguet and Charles-Albert Lehalle in [Cardaliaguet, P. and Lehalle, C.-A., Mean field game of controls and an application to trade crowding,…