Related papers: Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjecti…
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…
Networked multi-agent dynamical systems have been used to model how individual opinions evolve over time due to the opinions of other agents in the network. Particularly, such a model has been used to study how a planning agent can be used…
McFadden and Richter (1991) and later McFadden (2005) show that the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference characterizes rationalizability of choice probabilities through random utility models on finite universal choice spaces. This note…
We study random joint choice rules, allowing for interdependence of choice across agents. These capture random choice by multiple agents, or a single agent across goods or time periods. Our interest is in separable choice rules, where each…
To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
We explore conclusions a person draws from observing society when he allows for the possibility that individuals' outcomes are affected by group-level discrimination. Injecting a single non-classical assumption, that the agent is…
It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic choices under uncertainty. While a social planner would balance "exploration" and "exploitation" using a multi-armed bandit…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
We propose a robust method of discrete choice analysis when agents' choice sets are unobserved. Our core model assumes nothing about agents' choice sets apart from their minimum size. Importantly, it leaves unrestricted the dependence,…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
In a decision-making scenario, a principal could use conditional predictions from an expert agent to inform their choice. However, this approach would introduce a fundamental conflict of interest. An agent optimizing for predictive accuracy…
We introduce a new agent-based model of opinion dynamics in which binary opinions (yes/no) of each agent can be measured and described regarding both pre- and post-influence at both of two levels, public and private, vis-\`a-vis the…
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…