Related papers: Evasive Hardware Trojan through Adversarial Power …

Globalization in the semiconductor industry enables fabless design houses to reduce their costs, save time, and make use of newer technologies. However, the offshoring of Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication has negative sides, including…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…

The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based…

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are often preferred over custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) to achieve reduced system development time and cost, easy adoption of new technologies, and replaceability. Unfortunately, the integration…

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry heavily reuses third party IP cores. These IP cores are vulnerable to insertion of Hardware Trojans (HTs) at design time by third party IP core providers or by malicious insiders in the design…

The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting…

Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…

Machine learning-based hardware malware detectors (HMDs) offer a potential game changing advantage in defending systems against malware. However, HMDs suffer from adversarial attacks, can be effectively reverse-engineered and subsequently…

Insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs) in integrated circuits is a pernicious threat. Since HTs are activated under rare trigger conditions, detecting them using random logic simulations is infeasible. In this work, we design a reinforcement…

A massive threat to the modern and complex IC production chain is the use of untrusted off-shore foundries which are able to infringe valuable hardware design IP or to inject hardware Trojans causing severe loss of safety and security.…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…

This work focuses on advancing security research in the hardware design space by formally defining the realistic problem of Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. The goal is to model HT detection more closely to the real world, i.e., describing…

Always-on hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) have drawn more and more attention in both academia and industry because of its significant potential threat. In this paper, we proposed a novel HT detection method using information entropy based clustering, named…

Outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing to offshore foundries has grown exponentially in recent years. Given the critical role of ICs in the control and operation of vehicular systems and other modern engineering designs, such…

Current Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are mostly developed based on a limited set of HT benchmarks. Existing HT benchmark circuits are generated with multiple shortcomings, i.e., i) they are heavily biased by the designers'…

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…

Traditionally, inserting realistic Hardware Trojans (HTs) into complex hardware systems has been a time-consuming and manual process, requiring comprehensive knowledge of the design and navigating intricate Hardware Description Language…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities worldwide. The risk of using untrusted…

Backdoors pose a serious threat to machine learning, as they can compromise the integrity of security-critical systems, such as self-driving cars. While different defenses have been proposed to address this threat, they all rely on the…