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Kidney exchanges are organized markets where patients swap willing but incompatible donors. In the last decade, kidney exchanges grew from small and regional to large and national---and soon, international. This growth results in more lives…
This paper introduces a new learning-based approach for approximately solving the Kidney-Exchange Problem (KEP), an NP-hard problem on graphs. The problem consists of, given a pool of kidney donors and patients waiting for kidney donations,…
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic algorithm for transplant exchange selection may have superior…
In kidney exchange programs, multiple patient-donor pairs each of whom are otherwise incompatible, exchange their donors to receive compatible kidneys. The Kidney Exchange problem is typically modelled as a directed graph where every vertex…
In barter exchanges, participants swap goods with one another without exchanging money; exchanges are often facilitated by a central clearinghouse, with the goal of maximizing the aggregate quality (or number) of swaps. Barter exchanges are…
The seminal work of Roth, S\"onmez, & \"Unver shows that the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem for non-bipartite matching can be leveraged to yield a randomized algorithm to match patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange with extraordinarily…
The kidney exchange mechanism allows many patient-donor pairs who are otherwise incompatible with each other to come together and exchange kidneys along a cycle. However, due to infrastructure and legal constraints, kidney exchange can only…
In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in…
Background: The kidney exchange problem (KEP) addresses the matching of patients in need for a replacement organ with compatible living donors. Ideally many medical institutions should participate in a matching program to increase the…
We consider a well-studied online random graph model for kidney exchange, where nodes representing patient-donor pairs arrive over time, and the probability of a directed edge is p. We assume existence of a single altruistic donor, who…
The kidney paired donation (KPD) program provides an innovative solution to overcome incompatibility challenges in kidney transplants by matching incompatible donor-patient pairs and facilitating kidney exchanges. To address unequal access…
We introduce the Stackelberg kidney exchange problem. In this problem, an agent (e.g. a hospital or a national organization) has control over a number of incompatible patient-donor pairs whose patients are in need of a transplant. The agent…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient-donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at…
This paper addresses the problem of maximizing the expected size of a matching in the case of unreliable vertices and/or edges. The assumption is that upon failure, remaining vertices that have not been matched may be subject to a new…
Kidney transplants are sharply overdemanded in the United States. A recent innovation to address organ shortages is a kidney exchange, in which willing but medically incompatible patient-donor pairs swap donors so that two successful…
Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to arrive. We analyze a simple class of matching algorithms that…
Kidney exchange programs among hospitals in the United States and across European countries improve efficiency by pooling donors and patients on a centralized platform. Sustaining such cooperation requires stability. When the core is empty,…