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In this work we study an economic agent based model under different asymmetric information degrees. This model is quite simple and can be treated analytically since the buyers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only…
In many cases, assessing the quality of goods is hard. For example, when purchasing a car, it is hard to measure how pollutant the car is since there are infinitely many driving conditions to be tested. Typically, these situations are…
We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
Machine learning (ML) model trading, known for its role in protecting data privacy, faces a major challenge: information asymmetry. This issue can lead to model deception, a problem that current literature has not fully solved, where the…
In this paper we introduce two models of opinion dynamics in oligopoly markets and apply them to a situation, where a new entrant challenges two incumbents of the same size. The models differ in the way the two forces influencing consumer…
Motivated by the prevalence of prediction problems in the economy, we study markets in which firms sell models to a consumer to help improve their prediction. Firms decide whether to enter, choose models to train on their data, and set…
Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each…
This work addresses the buyer's inspection paradox for information markets. The paradox is that buyers need to access information to determine its value, while sellers need to limit access to prevent theft. To study this, we introduce an…
In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which…
As AI agents increasingly act on behalf of human stakeholders in economic settings, understanding their behavior in complex market environments becomes critical. This article examines how Large Language Models coordinate on markets that are…
When human agents come together to make decisions, it is often the case that one human agent has more information than the other. This phenomenon is called information asymmetry and this distorts the market. Often if one human agent intends…
We model competition on a credence goods market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the aggregate…
We study economies where consumers interact independently with many monopolists. When consumer valuations over goods are correlated, correlation can distort the induced distribution of consumer surplus (information rents). We identify which…
I develop a theoretical model to examine how the rise of autonomous AI (artificial intelligence) agents disrupts two-sided digital advertising markets. Through this framework, I demonstrate that users' rational, private decisions to…
Sales data in a commodity market (supermarket sales to consumers) has been analysed by studying the fluctuation spectrum and noise correlations. Three related products (ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce) have been analysed. Most noise in…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic…
This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender with private information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of having higher ability. Without commitment or costly signaling, market failure can occur.…
As awareness of health and environmental issues grows, the demand for organic food is rising worldwide, yet consumers still struggle to distinguish genuine organic products from conventional ones. This information asymmetry creates…