Related papers: DECLASSIFLOW: A Static Analysis for Modeling Non-S…
Developers rely on constant-time programming to prevent timing side-channel attacks. But these efforts can be undone by compilers, whose optimizations may silently reintroduce leaks. While recent works have measured the extent of such…
Regular expressions are a concise yet expressive language for expressing patterns. For instance, in networked software, they are used for input validation and intrusion detection. Yet some widely deployed regular expression matchers based…
Methods for proving that concurrent software does not leak its secrets has remained an active topic of research for at least the past four decades. Despite an impressive array of work, the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory.…
Speculative side-channel attacks access sensitive data and use transmitters to leak the data during wrong-path execution. Various defenses have been proposed to prevent such information leakage. However, not all speculatively executed…
Eliminating vulnerabilities from low-level code is vital for securing software. Static analysis is a promising approach for discovering vulnerabilities since it can provide developers early feedback on the code they write. But, it presents…
Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On…
Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to divert program execution away from the…
Code obfuscation is a major tool for protecting software intellectual property from attacks such as reverse engineering or code tampering. Yet, recently proposed (automated) attacks based on Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) shows very…
This paper provides the first systematic analysis of a synergistic threat model encompassing memory corruption vulnerabilities and microarchitectural side-channel vulnerabilities. We study speculative shield bypass attacks that leverage…
Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) provides a robust information-theoretical framework for designing secure systems with minimal information leakage. While previous research has addressed the design of such systems under hard constraints…
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…
In quantitative information flow we say that program $Q$ is "at least as secure as" $P$ just when the amount of secret information flowing from $Q$ is never more than flows from $P$, with of course a suitable quantification of "flow". This…
Irregular codes are bottlenecked by memory and communication latency. Decoupled access/execute (DAE) is a common technique to tackle this problem. It relies on the compiler to separate memory address generation from the rest of the program,…
This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a general concurrency language model, where concurrent objects interact by asynchronous method calls and futures.…
Deployed large language models (LLMs) often rely on speculative decoding, a technique that generates and verifies multiple candidate tokens in parallel, to improve throughput and latency. In this work, we reveal a new side-channel whereby…
We propose an approach on model checking information flow for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally models the execution of procedural…
This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow security properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra CSP_{4v} with security labelled…
Quantitative information flow (QIF) is traditionally defined as the expected value of information leakage over all feasible program runs and it fails to identify vulnerable programs where only limited number of runs leak large amount of…
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and…
Fine grained information flow monitoring can in principle address a wide range of security and privacy goals, for example in web applications. But it is very difficult to achieve sound monitoring with acceptable runtime cost and sufficient…