Related papers: Auctions and mass transportation
This paper is devoted to variational problems on the set of probability measures which involve optimal transport between unequal dimensional spaces. In particular, we study the minimization of a functional consisting of the sum of a term…
In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…
Novel auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e.…
We study the optimal transport problem in the Euclidean space where the cost function is given by the value function associated with a Linear Quadratic minimization problem. Under appropriate assumptions, we generalize Brenier's Theorem…
Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…
We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The analysis of these auctions based on the empirical equilibrium refinement of Velez and…
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. While there has been a lot of attention on the auction process and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on the advertisers. In particular,…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a…
We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of rate allocation in mobile data-offloading markets. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell…
We consider a class of convex optimization problems modelling temporal mass transport and mass change between two given mass distributions (the so-called dynamic formulation of unbalanced transport), where we focus on those models for which…
We investigate the 1D version of the notable Bressan's mixing conjecture, and introduce various formulation in the classical optimal transport setting, the branched optimal transport setting and a combinatorial optimization. In the discrete…
We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…
We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the…
We introduce a general notion of transport cost that encompasses many costs used in the literature (including the classical one and weak transport costs introduced by Talagrand and Marton in the 90's), and prove a Kantorovich type duality…
In classical optimal transport, the contributions of Benamou$-$Brenier and McCann regarding the time-dependent version of the problem are cornerstones of the field and form the basis for a variety of applications in other mathematical…
In this paper we extend the duality theory of the multi-marginal optimal transport problem for cost functions depending on a decreasing function of the distance (not necessarily bounded). This class of cost functions appears in the context…
Task allocation problems have traditionally focused on cost optimization. However, more and more attention is being given to cases in which cost should not always be the sole or major consideration. In this paper we study a fair task…
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution of bidders'…
This study explores the design of an efficient rebate policy in auction markets, focusing on a continuous-time setting with competition among market participants. In this model, a stock exchange collects transaction fees from auction…