Related papers: Supporting punishment via taxation in a structured…

This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…

The link between taxation and justice is a classic debate issue, while also being very relevant at a time of changing environmental factors and conditions of the social and economic system. Technologically speaking, there are three types of…

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of…

This paper presents a computational evolutionary game model to study and understand fraud dynamics in the consumption tax system. Players are cooperators if they correctly declare their value added tax (VAT), and are defectors otherwise.…

Cooperation in evolutionary biology means paying a cost, c, to enjoy benefits, b. A defector is one who does not pay any cost but enjoys the benefits of cooperators. Human societies, especially, have evolved a strategy to discourage…

The conflict between individual and collective interests makes fostering cooperation in human societies a challenging task, requiring drastic measures such as the establishment of sanctioning institutions. These institutions are costly…

Indirect punishment traditionally sustains cooperation in social systems through reputation or norms, often by reducing defectors' payoffs indirectly. In this study, we redefine indirect punishment for structured populations as a spatially…

In this paper we present a simplified model of a proportional taxation system where citizens decide whether to pay taxes or evade them. We initially derive a dynamic equation for the fraction of evaders and then present both its critical…

Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with…

The sustainability of cooperation is crucial for understanding the progress of societies. We study a repeated game in which individuals decide the share of their income to transfer to other group members. A central feature of our model is…

We study the role of imitation within a model of economics with adaptive agents. The basic ingredients are those of the Minority Game. We add the possibility of local information exchange and imitation of the neighbour's strategy. Imitators…

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is,…

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…

Indirect reciprocity is a plausible mechanism for sustaining cooperation: people cooperate with those who have a good reputation, which can be acquired by helping others. However, this mechanism requires the population to agree on who has…

The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…

In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…

Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…

Social consensus is important for society. Sometimes the success of society depends on a consensus (e.g. the decision to pay taxes or to commit to the constitution). Examples for continuous opinion dynamics are discussions about tax rates…

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In…