Related papers: Nash Equilibria of Two-round Auctions
With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large effort to study seller revenue maximization, following Myerson's seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of view of the buyer in…
The problem of robust dynamic pricing of an abstract commodity, whose inventory is specified at an initial time but never subsequently replenished, originally studied by Perakis and Sood (2006) in discrete time, is considered from the…
In an era of "moving fast and breaking things", regulators have moved slowly to pick up the safety, bias, and legal debris left in the wake of broken Artificial Intelligence (AI) deployment. While there is much-warranted discussion about…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page. This gives rise to a bipartite matching market that is…
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications when agents with non-linear (specifically, convex) disutility…
The internet advertising market is a multi-billion dollar industry, in which advertisers buy thousands of ad placements every day by repeatedly participating in auctions. An important and ubiquitous feature of these auctions is the presence…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…
In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO's bid treated by the auctioneer as if it had been submitted…
A standard result from auction theory is that bidding truthfully in a second price auction is a weakly dominant strategy. The result, however, does not apply in the presence of Cost Per Action (CPA) constraints. Such constraints exist, for…
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private…
Throttling is a popular method of budget management for online ad auctions in which the platform modulates the participation probability of an advertiser in order to smoothly spend her budget across many auctions. In this work, we…
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
This paper studies inference in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with many bidders, using an asymptotic framework where the number of bidders increases while the number of auctions remains fixed. Our approach enables…
Applications of combinatorial auctions (CA) as market mechanisms are prevalent in practice, yet their Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) remain poorly understood. Analytical solutions are known only for a few cases where the problem can be…
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…