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We study various discrete nonlinear combinatorial optimization problems in an online learning framework. In the first part, we address the question of whether there are negative results showing that getting a vanishing (or even vanishing…
This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the…
In online learning, a decision maker repeatedly selects one of a set of actions, with the goal of minimizing the overall loss incurred. Following the recent line of research on algorithms endowed with additional predictive features, we…
Policy gradient methods have become a staple of any single-agent reinforcement learning toolbox, due to their combination of desirable properties: iterate convergence, efficient use of stochastic trajectory feedback, and theoretically-sound…
We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing…
We design and analyze minimax-optimal algorithms for online linear optimization games where the player's choice is unconstrained. The player strives to minimize regret, the difference between his loss and the loss of a post-hoc benchmark…
By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form…
The behavior of no-regret learning algorithms is well understood in two-player min-max (i.e, zero-sum) games. In this paper, we investigate the behavior of no-regret learning in min-max games with dependent strategy sets, where the strategy…
Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game…
The Hybrid Online Learning Problem, where features are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution but labels are generated adversarially, is a well-motivated setting positioned between statistical and fully-adversarial online learning. Prior…
An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…
Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…
This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both…
Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…
Consider an online convex optimization problem where the loss functions are self-concordant barriers, smooth relative to a convex function $h$, and possibly non-Lipschitz. We analyze the regret of online mirror descent with $h$. Then, based…
We consider online learning with feedback graphs, a sequential decision-making framework where the learner's feedback is determined by a directed graph over the action set. We present a computationally efficient algorithm for learning in…
The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a…
In this paper, the online variants of the classical Frank-Wolfe algorithm are considered. We consider minimizing the regret with a stochastic cost. The online algorithms only require simple iterative updates and a non-adaptive step size…