Related papers: Monte Carlo Optimization for Solving Multilevel St…

We consider the multi-agent spatial navigation problem of computing the socially optimal order of play, i.e., the sequence in which the agents commit to their decisions, and its associated equilibrium in an N-player Stackelberg trajectory…

Autocurricular training is an important sub-area of multi-agent reinforcement learning~(MARL) that allows multiple agents to learn emergent skills in an unsupervised co-evolving scheme. The robotics community has experimented autocurricular…

We study a bilevel optimization problem which is a zero-sum Stackelberg game. In this problem, there are two players, a leader and a follower, who pick items from a common set. Both the leader and the follower have their own…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have been attracting a great deal of attention because of their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems. Although significant progress has been made recently, the…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

Hierarchical decision making problems, such as bilevel programs and Stackelberg games, are attracting increasing interest in both the engineering and machine learning communities. Yet, existing solution methods lack either convergence…

We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…

The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…

In 1996, Mallozzi and Morgan [33] proposed a new model for Stackelberg games which we refer here to as the Bayesian approach. The leader has only partial information about how followers select their reaction among possibly multiple optimal…

This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…

This paper focuses on multi-stage coordination for a population of thermostatically controlled loads (TCL). Each load maximizes the individual utility in response to an energy price, while the coordinator determines the price to maximize…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have attracted a great deal of attention recently as their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems has become evident. In this paper, we study min-max games with…

In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires…

Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…

This paper is devoted to a Stackelberg stochastic differential game for a linear mean-field type stochastic differential system with a mean-field type quadratic cost functional in finite horizon. The coefficients in the state equation and…

We consider the Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints, an extension of the classic 0-1 knapsack problem formulated as a Stackelberg game with two agents, a leader and a follower, that choose items from a common set and hold their…

We consider an N-player hierarchical game in which the i-th player's objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of…

In this paper,we mainly focus on the numerical solution of high-dimensional stochastic optimal control problem driven by fully-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs in short) through deep learning. We first…