Related papers: Transitions of Solutions and Their Efficiency
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
In this article, we revisit a communication-control co-design problem for a class of two-player stochastic differential games on an infinite horizon. Each 'player' represents two active decision makers, namely a scheduler and a remote…
We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness…
We investigate the relationship between the team-optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium (NE) to assess the impact of strategy deviation on team performance. As a working use case, we focus on a class of flow assignment problems in which…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Job-scheduling games have traditionally assumed fixed processing times. However, in many realistic environments, ranging from cyber-security response to high-frequency trading, a task's duration depends on its starting time. We study…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…
In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…
Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…
Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common interests. Synchronous coordination, characterized by simultaneous commitments,…
The use of game theoretic models has been quite successful in describing various cooperative and non-cooperative optimization problems in networks and other domains of computer systems. In this paper, we study an application of game…
The distributed task allocation problem, as one of the most interesting distributed optimization challenges, has received considerable research attention recently. Previous works mainly focused on the task allocation problem in a population…
The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…
Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…