Related papers: The CURE To Vulnerabilities in RPKI Validation
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the main mechanism to protect inter-domain routing with BGP from prefix hijacks. It has already been widely deployed by large providers and the adoption rate is getting to a critical point.…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) secures the Internet's routing system by defining a complex trust and validation framework for certificates, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), manifests, and Certificate Revocation Lists…
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a critical security mechanism for BGP, but the complexity of its architecture is a growing concern as its adoption scales. Current RPKI design heavily reuses legacy PKI components, such as X.509…
To protect against prefix hijacks, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has been standardized. To enjoy the security guarantees of RPKI validation, networks need to install a new component, the relying party validator, which fetches…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has become essential to secure inter-domain routing. Despite its critical role, RPKI software remains largely untested beyond shallow parsing. Existing fuzzers, like AFL++ or libFuzzer, do not…
In this work, we present a novel severe buffer-overflow vulnerability in the RPKI validator Fort, that allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the machine running the software. We discuss the unique impact of this RCE…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) protocol was standardized to add cryptographic security to Internet routing. With over 50% of Internet resources protected with RPKI today, the protocol already impacts significant parts of…
IP prefix hijacks allow adversaries to redirect and intercept traffic, posing a threat to the stability and security of the Internet. To prevent prefix hijacks, networks should deploy RPKI and filter bogus BGP announcements with invalid…
We demonstrate the first downgrade attacks against RPKI. The key design property in RPKI that allows our attacks is the tradeoff between connectivity and security: when networks cannot retrieve RPKI information from publication points, they…
The RPKI is crucial for securing the routing system of the Internet. With the RPKI, owners of Internet resources can make cryptographically backed claims, for example about the legitimate origin of their IP space. Thousands of networks use…
BGP is the default inter-domain routing protocol in today's Internet, but has serious security vulnerabilities\cite{murphy2005bgp}. One of them is (sub)prefix hijacking. IETF standardizes RPKI to validate the AS origin but RPKI has a lot of…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) aims to secure internet routing by creating an infrastructure where resource holders can make attestations about their resources. RPKI Certificate Authorities issue these attestations and…
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is vital to the security of inter-domain routing. However, RPKI enables Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) to unilaterally takedown IP prefixes - indeed, such attacks have been launched by…
To mitigate BGP prefix hijacking, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) provides prefix origin authentication via Route Origin Validation (ROV). Despite extensive measurement efforts in IPv4, the protective impact of ROV in IPv6 has…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) secures Internet routing by binding IP prefixes to authorized Autonomous Systems, yet its RSA foundations are vulnerable to quantum adversaries. A naive swap to post-quantum (PQ) signatures (eg…
The long history of misconfigurations and errors in RPKI indicates that they cannot be easily avoided and will most probably persist also in the future. These errors create conflicts between BGP announcements and their covering ROAs,…
Networks (Autonomous Systems-AS) allocate or revoke IP prefixes with the intervention of official Internet resource number authorities, and select and advertise policy-compliant paths towards these prefixes using the inter-domain routing…
Though not yet widely deployed, password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have been the subject of several recent standardization efforts, partly because of their resistance against various guessing attacks, but also because they…
Web content delivery is one of the most important services on the Internet. Access to websites is typically secured via TLS. However, this security model does not account for prefix hijacking on the network layer, which may lead to traffic…
We explore the security of residential routers and find a range of critical vulnerabilities. Our evaluations show that 10 out of 36 popular routers are vulnerable to injections of fake records via misinterpretation of special characters. We…