Related papers: Minimizing Maximum Dissatisfaction in the Allocati…
We study a simple exchange market, introduced by Gourv\'{e}s, Lesca and Wilczynski (IJCAI-17), where every agent initially holds a single object. The agents have preferences over the objects, and two agents may swap their objects if they…
The paper focuses on two problems: (i) how to orient the edges of an undirected graph in order to maximize the number of ordered vertex pairs (x,y) such that there is a directed path from x to y, and (ii) how to orient the edges so as to…
We consider the optimal multi-agent persistent monitoring problem defined by a team of cooperating agents visiting a set of nodes (targets) on a graph with the objective of minimizing a measure of overall node state uncertainty. The…
In this paper, a distributed subgradient-based algorithm is proposed for continuous-time multi-agent systems to search a feasible solution to convex inequalities. The algorithm involves each agent achieving a state constrained by its own…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…
We consider a class of distributed submodular maximization problems in which each agent must choose a single strategy from its strategy set. The global objective is to maximize a submodular function of the strategies chosen by each agent.…
Ranking items by their probability of relevance has long been the goal of conventional ranking systems. While this maximizes traditional criteria of ranking performance, there is a growing understanding that it is an oversimplification in…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
The paper addresses the problem of consensus seeking among second-order linear agents interconnected in a specific ring topology. Unlike the existing results in the field dealing with one-directional digraphs arising in various cyclic…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…
This paper introduces a parallel scheduling problem where a directed acyclic graph modeling $t$ tasks and their dependencies needs to be executed on $n$ unreliable workers. Worker $i$ executes task $j$ correctly with probability $p_{i,j}$.…
We consider the house allocation problem, where $m$ houses are to be assigned to $n$ agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so,…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that…
When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
This paper considers the optimal multi-agent persistent monitoring problem defined for a team of agents on a set of nodes (targets) interconnected according to a fixed network topology. The aim is to control this team so as to minimize a…
We propose a novel and efficient algorithm for the collaborative preference completion problem, which involves jointly estimating individualized rankings for a set of entities over a shared set of items, based on a limited number of…