Related papers: A method for multi-leader-multi-follower games by …

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…

We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) has recently gained immense interest due to its potential for sample efficiency and ability to incorporate off-policy data. However, designing stable and efficient MBRL algorithms using rich…

In this study, we explore the application of game theory, in particular Stackelberg games, to address the issue of effective coordination strategy generation for heterogeneous robots with one-way communication. To that end, focusing on the…

We introduce the framework of LLM-Stackelberg games, a class of sequential decision-making models that integrate large language models (LLMs) into strategic interactions between a leader and a follower. Departing from classical Stackelberg…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…

Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…

We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the…

Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…

We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…

In this work, we propose the first fully first-order method to compute an epsilon stationary Stackelberg equilibrium with convergence guarantees. To achieve this, we first reframe the leader follower interaction as single level constrained…

In 1996, Mallozzi and Morgan [33] proposed a new model for Stackelberg games which we refer here to as the Bayesian approach. The leader has only partial information about how followers select their reaction among possibly multiple optimal…

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal…

We consider a bilevel optimization problem having a single leader and multiple followers. The followers choose their strategies simultaneously, and are assumed to converge to a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We begin by providing a…

This paper addresses a Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game under closed-loop information, a problem inherently time-inconsistent. Existing approaches rely on solving two coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)…

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…