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Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…
While in two-player zero-sum games the Nash equilibrium is a well-established prescriptive notion of optimal play, its applicability as a prescriptive tool beyond that setting is limited. Consequently, the study of decentralized learning…
Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a broad class of learning dynamics, including Optimistic…
The problem of opportunistic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks has been recently formulated as a non-Bayesian restless multi-armed bandit problem. In this problem, there are N arms (corresponding to channels) and one player…
We consider a family of learning strategies for online optimization problems that evolve in continuous time and we show that they lead to no regret. From a more traditional, discrete-time viewpoint, this continuous-time approach allows us…
Recent breakthrough results by Dagan, Daskalakis, Fishelson and Golowich [2023] and Peng and Rubinstein [2023] established an efficient algorithm attaining at most $\epsilon$ swap regret over extensive-form strategy spaces of dimension $N$…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
We consider the problem of online prediction in a marginally stable linear dynamical system subject to bounded adversarial or (non-isotropic) stochastic perturbations. This poses two challenges. Firstly, the system is in general…
Reinforcement learning (RL) so far has limited real-world applications. One key challenge is that typical RL algorithms heavily rely on a reset mechanism to sample proper initial states; these reset mechanisms, in practice, are expensive to…
In this paper we focus on the problem of Online Principal Component Analysis in the regret minimization framework. For this problem, all existing regret minimization algorithms for the fully-adversarial setting are based on a positive…
We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…
The Certainty Equivalent heuristic (CE) is a widely-used algorithm for various dynamic resource allocation problems in OR and OM. Despite its popularity, existing theoretical guarantees of CE are limited to settings satisfying restrictive…
This paper studies the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games in a distributed manner in which the players communicate with a set of system nodes over noisy communication channels. The complexity of solving each game…
We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…
Designing efficient algorithms to compute Nash equilibria poses considerable challenges in Algorithmic Game Theory and Optimization. In this work, we employ integer programming techniques to compute Nash equilibria in Integer Programming…