Related papers: Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auct…
Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings.…
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over $n$ items. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are…
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…
We consider the process consisting of preparation, transmission through a quantum channel, and subsequent measurement of quantum states. The communication complexity of the channel is the minimal amount of classical communication required…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication to explicitly state, such as subadditive or XOS), or…
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with $\mathsf{SubAdd}\cup\mathsf{SingleM}$. We show that for…
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism…
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with $m$ items and two subadditive bidders. A $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation can be guaranteed by a trivial randomized protocol with zero communication, or…
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…
A two-party quantum communication process with classical inputs and outcomes can be simulated by replacing the quantum channel with a classical one. The minimal amount of classical communication required to reproduce the statistics of the…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
We investigates a model of hybrid classical-quantum communication complexity, in which two parties first exchange classical messages and subsequently communicate using quantum messages. We study the trade-off between the classical and…
Communication complexity is a fundamental aspect of information science, concerned with the amount of communication required to solve a problem distributed among multiple parties. The standard quantification of one-way communication…
We analyze utility of communication channels in absence of any short of quantum or classical correlation shared between the sender and the receiver. To this aim, we propose a class of two-party communication games, and show that the games…
In communication complexity-like problems, previous studies have shown either an exponential quantum advantage or an unbounded quantum advantage with an exponentially large input set $\Theta(2^{n})$ bits with respect to classical…
We study a new type of separation between quantum and classical communication complexity which is obtained using quantum protocols where all parties are efficient, in the sense that they can be implemented by small quantum circuits with…