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We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…
We study optimal reinsurance in the framework of stochastic game theory, in which there is an insurer and two reinsurers. A Stackelberg model is established to analyze the non-cooperative relationship between the insurer and reinsurers,…
Pharmaceutical markets for life-saving therapies combine monopoly power with insurance coverage. We build a tractable sequential game in which a patent-holder chooses the drug price, a profit-maximising insurer sets its premium, and a…
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and…
This paper studies the robust reinsurance and investment games for competitive insurers. Model uncertainty is characterized by a class of equivalent probability measures. Each insurer is concerned with relative performance under the…
We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…
This paper develops a dynamic insurance market model comprising two competing insurance companies and a continuum of insureds, and examines the interaction between strategic underreporting by the insureds and competitive pricing between the…
We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…
In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…
We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank, Soner, Vo{\ss} (2017). Specifically, both agents track their own stochastic running trading targets while interacting through…
We study a reinsurer who faces multiple sources of model uncertainty. The reinsurer offers contracts to $n$ insurers whose claims follow compound Poisson processes representing both idiosyncratic and systemic sources of loss. As the…
We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…
This paper investigates a Stackelberg game between an insurer and a reinsurer under the $\alpha$-maxmin mean-variance criterion. The insurer can purchase per-loss reinsurance from the reinsurer. With the insurer's feedback reinsurance…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
We study Stackelberg Equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to…
We study a stochastic differential game in a ruin theoretic environment. In our setting two insurers compete for market share, which is represented by a joint performance functional. Consequently, one of the insurers strives to maximize it,…
We study a new kind of non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a…
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of the insurance market that jointly characterizes insurers' underwriting, investment, recapitalization, and dividend policies under model uncertainty and financial frictions. Competitive…
We consider the insurance company as a physical system which is immersed in its environment (the financial market). The insurer company interacts with the market by exchanging the money through the payments for loss claims and receiving the…