Related papers: Popularity on the 3D-Euclidean Stable Roommates
We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete…
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each voter supports the candidate that is closest under a distance induced by an…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people, with each person having a preference list that ranks a subset of $A$ as his/her acceptable partners in order of preference, we consider the Roommates Problem (RP) and the Marriage Problem (MP) of matching…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both…
This work concerns an alignment problem that has applications in many geospatial problems such as resource allocation and building reliable disease maps. Here, we introduce the problem of optimally aligning $k$ collections of $m$ spatial…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter…
Various real-world problems consist of partitioning a set of locations into disjoint subsets, each subset spread in a way that it covers the whole set with a certain radius. Given a finite set S, a metric d, and a radius r, define a subset…
We model the societal task of redistricting political districts as a partitioning problem: Given a set of $n$ points in the plane, each belonging to one of two parties, and a parameter $k$, our goal is to compute a partition $\Pi$ of the…