Related papers: Ultimatum game: regret or fairness?
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
In order to monitor and prevent bias in AI systems we can use a wide range of (statistical) fairness measures. However, it is mathematically impossible to optimize for all of these measures at the same time. In addition, optimizing a…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
This paper introduces a framework for finite non-cooperative games where each player faces a globally uncertain parameter with no common prior. Every player chooses both a mixed strategy and projects an emergent subjective prior to the…
We initiate the study of a repeated principal-agent problem over a finite horizon $T$, where a principal sequentially interacts with $K\geq 2$ types of agents arriving in an adversarial order. At each round, the principal strategically…
How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a challenging question. For the fundamental model system of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, classic game theory of infinite rationality predicts the Nash equilibrium…
In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect in many…
Recently, reputation-based indirect reciprocity has been widely applied to the study on fairness behavior. Previous works mainly investigate indirect reciprocity by considering compulsory participation. While in reality, individuals may…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
We introduce the study of fairness in multi-armed bandit problems. Our fairness definition can be interpreted as demanding that given a pool of applicants (say, for college admission or mortgages), a worse applicant is never favored over a…
The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people which leads to speculative crashes or escalation can be…
No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy…
While conventional ranking systems focus solely on maximizing the utility of the ranked items to users, fairness-aware ranking systems additionally try to balance the exposure for different protected attributes such as gender or race. To…
The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…
In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably…
In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub-reactive strategies.…
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…
Algorithmic recourse -- providing recommendations to those affected negatively by the outcome of an algorithmic system on how they can take action and change that outcome -- has gained attention as a means of giving persons agency in their…
Using data obtained in a controlled ad-auction experiment that we ran, we evaluate the regret-based approach to econometrics that was recently suggested by Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (EC 2015). We found that despite the weak…
Classical coding-theoretic guarantees often rely on trust assumptions, such as requiring sufficiently many honest nodes compared with adversarial ones. These assumptions are difficult to enforce in open decentralized systems where…