Related papers: Contract Design With Safety Inspections
In this paper, we study robust distributed sub-optimal coordination of linear agents subject to input nonlinearities. Inspired by the robust agreement literature, we formulate a bounded distributed sub-optimal coordination problem, in which…
Many modern software systems are built as a set of autonomous software components (also called agents) that collaborate with each other and are situated in an environment. To keep these multiagent systems operational under abnormal…
Consider a group of effort-averse, or lazy, sensors that seek to minimize the effort invested to collect measurements of a variable. Increasing the effort invested by the sensors improves the quality of the measurements provided to the…
Contract scheduling is a widely studied framework for designing real-time systems with interruptible capabilities. Previous work has showed that a prediction on the interruption time can help improve the performance of contract-based…
Perception contracts provide a method for evaluating safety of control systems that use machine learning for perception. A perception contract is a specification for testing the ML components, and it gives a method for proving end-to-end…
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
We consider a general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on a finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following: we first find the contract that is optimal…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis…
In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution…
Consider costly and time-consuming tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization (knapsack) problem, which admits an FPTAS. Now assume an…
Systems engineering processes coordinate the effort of different individuals to generate a product satisfying certain requirements. As the involved engineers are self-interested agents, the goals at different levels of the systems…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospital, university, prison...). One drawback of this contract is…
We present SPEAR, a multi-agent coordination framework for smart contract auditing that applies established MAS patterns in a realistic security analysis workflow. SPEAR models auditing as a coordinated mission carried out by specialized…
The problem of controlling multi-agent systems under different models of information sharing among agents has received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider a setup where rather than committing to a…
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performance-based compensation generates incentives that cascade through the organization,…
The consensus control with optimal cost remains major challenging although consensus control problems have been well studied in recent years. In this paper, we study the consensus control of multi-agent system associated with a given cost…
A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…