Related papers: Multilateral matching with scale economies
We introduce a new framework to model interactions among agents which seek to trade to minimize their risk with respect to some future outcome. We quantify this risk using the concept of risk measures from finance, and introduce a class of…
The opinion dynamics of economic agents is modeled with the link structure influenced by the resulting opinions: Links between people of nearly the same opinion are more stable than those between people of vastly different opinions. A…
We study sequential multi-issue trading between two greedily rational agents who exchange resources from a finite set of categories. Each agent's utility depends on its allocation, but the offering agent does not know the responding agent's…
In this paper, we study multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocations. Agents have local demand and resource supply, and are interconnected through a network designed to support sharing of the local resource; and the network…
This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…
Horizontal agreements can fall within the scope of exemptions to antitrust competition if they are expected to create pro-consumer benefits. Inspired by such horizontal agreements, we introduce a cooperative game in which a set of transport…
A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a…
A platform commits to a search algorithm that maps prices to search order. Given this algorithm, sellers set prices, and consumers engage in sequential search. This framework generalizes the ordered search literature. We introduce a special…
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities as autonomous agents with rapidly expanding applications in various domains. As these agents increasingly engage in socioeconomic interactions, identifying their…
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…
In open agent systems, the set of agents that are cooperating or competing changes over time and in ways that are nontrivial to predict. For example, if collaborative robots were tasked with fighting wildfires, they may run out of…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines…
Consider a university assigning students to courses and dorms. While many mechanisms are available, they each have their own drawbacks. Running serial dictatorship once for all goods is highly unfair, but running serial dictatorship…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…
The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…
Ladder diagrams are relevant for the study of bound states. The condition upon the coupling strength for the existence of a bound state has been deduced in a scalar field theory for the case of low mass exchanges. We apply this approach to…