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We propose a mean field control game model for the intra-and-inter-bank borrowing and lending problem. This framework allows to study the competitive game arising between groups of collaborative banks. The solution is provided in terms of…

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…

Stochastic games provide a framework for interactions among multiple agents and enable a myriad of applications. In these games, agents decide on actions simultaneously, the state of every agent moves to the next state, and each agent…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, {\em at a minimum}, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The algorithm that has come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been proven to…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some…

Methods like multi-agent reinforcement learning struggle to scale with growing population size. Mean-field games (MFGs) are a game-theoretic approach that can circumvent this by finding a solution for an abstract infinite population, which…

Markov games provide a powerful framework for modeling strategic multi-agent interactions in dynamic environments. Traditionally, convergence properties of decentralized learning algorithms in these settings have been established only for…

We investigate Nash equilibrium learning in a competitive Markov Game (MG) environment, where multiple agents compete, and multiple Nash equilibria can exist. In particular, for an oligopolistic dynamic pricing environment, exact Nash…

Green Security Games (GSGs) have been successfully used in the protection of valuable resources such as fisheries, forests and wildlife. While real-world deployment involves both resource allocation and subsequent coordinated patrolling…

Markov games (MGs) provide a mathematical foundation for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), enabling self-interested agents to learn their optimal policies while interacting with others in a shared environment. However, due to the…

Finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) arise as limits of large interacting particle systems and are governed by an MFG system, a coupled forward-backward differential equation consisting of a forward Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation…

Decentralized online learning for seeking generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of noncooperative games in dynamic environments is studied in this paper. Each player aims at selfishly minimizing its own time-varying cost function subject to…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…

In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As…

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…

We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…

In this paper, we investigate a competitive market involving two agents who consider both their own wealth and the wealth gap with their opponent. Both agents can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky…