Related papers: Noise-induced stochastic Nash equilibrium
This paper investigates a distributed robust Nash Equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for second-order players subject to external disturbances and uncertain dynamics while communicating via semi-Markov switching topologies. To accommodate the…
Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…
Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a `local Nash equilibrium` (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…
In this paper, we consider stochastic monotone Nash games where each player's strategy set is characterized by possibly a large number of explicit convex constraint inequalities. Notably, the functional constraints of each player may depend…
Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending…
In this paper, we focus on the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) which is an important and widely-used model in many different fields. In this model, subject to certain global resource constraints, a set of…
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…
Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from…
We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…
Many optimization tasks have to be handled in noisy environments, where we cannot obtain the exact evaluation of a solution but only a noisy one. For noisy optimization tasks, evolutionary algorithms (EAs), a kind of stochastic…
We investigate the fluctuations induced by irrationality in simple games with a large number of competing players. We show that Nash equilibria in such games are ``weakly'' stable: irrationality propagates and amplifies through players'…
We consider a slightly modified version of the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game from the point of view of evolutionary stability. In its classical version the game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) not stable against mutants. We find a…
Neural Architecture Search (NAS) has recently become a topic of great interest. However, there is a potentially impactful issue within NAS that remains largely unrecognized: noise. Due to stochastic factors in neural network initialization,…
We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
Discovering the underlying relationships among variables from temporal observations has been a longstanding challenge in numerous scientific disciplines, including biology, finance, and climate science. The dynamics of such systems are…
We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines…