Related papers: CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Prot…
Proof-of-concept exploits help demonstrate software vulnerability beyond doubt and communicate attacks to non-experts. But exploits can be configuration-specific, for example when in Security APIs, where keys are set up specifically for the…
In today's world, computer networks have become vulnerable to numerous attacks. In both wireless and wired networks, one of the most common attacks is man-in-the-middle attacks, within which session hijacking, context confusion attacks have…
We establish fundamental and general techniques for formal verification of quantum protocols. Quantum protocols are novel communication schemes involving the use of quantum-mechanical phenomena for representation, storage and transmission…
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive…
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: i) To design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the…
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the…
Gradual verification, which supports explicitly partial specifications and verifies them with a combination of static and dynamic checks, makes verification more incremental and provides earlier feedback to developers. While an abstract,…
We develop a general framework for parameter estimation that allows only trusted parties to access the result and achieves optimal precision. The protocols are designed such that adversaries can access some information indeterministically,…
Most software domains rely on compilers to translate high-level code to multiple different machine languages, with performance not too much worse than what developers would have the patience to write directly in assembly language. However,…
A cryptographic compiler introduced by Kalai et al. (STOC'23) converts any nonlocal game into an interactive protocol with a single computationally bounded prover. Although the compiler is known to be sound in the case of classical provers…
In this paper, we propose quantum position-verification schemes where all the channels are untrusted except the position of the prover and distant reference stations of verifiers. We review and analyze the existing QPV schemes containing…
In this work we present and formally analyze CHAT-SRP (CHAos based Tickets-Secure Registration Protocol), a protocol to provide interactive and collaborative platforms with a cryptographically robust solution to classical security issues.…
We consider the implementation of two-party cryptographic primitives based on the sole assumption that no large-scale reliable quantum storage is available to the cheating party. We construct novel protocols for oblivious transfer and bit…
Computational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verification of security protocols. Current tools for proving it rely on cryptographic game transformations. We follow Bana and Comon's approach, axiomatizing what an…
We suggest two new methodologies for the design of efficient secure protocols, that differ with respect to their underlying computational models. In one methodology we utilize the communication complexity tree (or branching for f and…
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…
We present an algorithm to certify IP spoofing protection of firewall rulesets. The algorithm is machine-verifiably proven sound and its use is demonstrated in real-world scenarios.
We consider a new model for the testing of untrusted quantum devices, consisting of a single polynomial-time bounded quantum device interacting with a classical polynomial-time verifier. In this model we propose solutions to two tasks - a…
Achieving quantum computational advantage requires solving a classically intractable problem on a quantum device. Natural proposals rely upon the intrinsic hardness of classically simulating quantum mechanics; however, verifying the output…
We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide…